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ABSTRACT 
In the last decade, shadow banking in China has expanded rapidly, driven 
predominantly by banking regulations and credit restrictions on specific industries. 
Wealth management products are considered the largest contributors to the overall 
shadow banking sector in China. The majority of these products are off the balance 
sheet and offer much higher yields than conventional deposit rates. This study aims to 
examine how commercial banks, more specifically small and medium-sized banks 
(SMBs), utilize wealth management products to offer higher yields on new products. 
This study comprises the top 30 Chinese banks from the first quarter of 2013 to the 
last quarter of 2019. A fixed-effects approach was adopted by implementing the panel 
corrected standard errors (PCSE) and Driscoll and Kraay standard errors (DKSE) 
models. This study found that for SMBs, the issuance of WMPs has a positive and 
significant impact on the yields of new products, but there is no such significant 
relationship exists for large four banks. 
JEL classification: G21, G28, G32, C33 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The state-owned banking system has dominated the Chinese financial system. Despite the 
comprehensive regulations imposed by the regulators, this sector has undergone a gradual 
growth. Shadow banking is not seen as a defamed phenomenon in China; instead, it helps 
satisfy the high demand for capital flow. In the last decade, China's shadow banking has been 
rising significantly. According to (Moody's, 2020), the estimated generally specified shadow 
banking assets were listed as RMB 59 trillion as of the last quarter of 2019, compared to 
RMB 17.3 trillion in 2010.  
In this study, we examine the wealth management products (WMPs) issued by China's 
top commercial banks; these products are considered an essential element of the shadow 
banking sector. These bank-issued WMPs are viewed as a competitive alternative to bank 
deposits. The WMPs, bundled with fixed maturities, also have higher yields than conventional 
deposit rates; ultimately, the WMPs can be financial instruments that reach the customers 
through banking networks. The non-guaranteed WMPs constitute a large portion of the total 
number of WMPs, which are off the balance sheet products with fixed maturities. The funds 
generated from WMPs can be invested in loan assets originating by banks and bundled by 
other financial intermediaries. Consequently, credit is provided without increasing the loan 
balance on-balance-sheet. On the liability side of their balance sheet, banks can offer higher 
rates to attract new financing, as the interest rates of WMPs are not regulated as deposits. The 
principal investment of WMPs could be either guaranteed or not. According to CBRC criteria, 
principal-guaranteed WMPs are often included as deposits on the balance sheet. While 
principal-non-guaranteed WMPs are viewed as off-balance sheet liabilities. Banks have the 
option to boost their deposit balances by changing the structure of these WMPs (Acharya et 
al., 2020).  
By employing a comprehensive sample of the top 30 Chinese banks, these 30 banks are 
the leading issuers of WMPs and comprise 70% of the total commercial banking systems' 
assets. For a dataset from the first quarter of 2013 to the last quarter of 2019, this study 
performed fixed effects by empirically implementing the Panel Corrected standard error 
(PCSE) and Driscoll and Kraay standard errors (DKSE) models. Three vital conclusions were 
drawn from our analysis. First, the non-guaranteed WMPs and total WMPs have a positive 
and significant impact on the yields of newly issued WMPs by banks. Second, for SMBs, 
issuance of both non-guaranteed and total WMPs has a positive and significant impact on the 
yields of the new WMPs, but there is no such significant relationship exists for large four 
banks. Third, SHIBOR-d (the difference between SHIBOR and deposit rate) was positive and 
significant for large banks and SMBs, as both types of banks regularly tap the inter-bank 
market to fulfill their liquidity needs acquire funds to cover a portion of their maturing 
WMPs.  
This study contributes to the growing literature on shadow banking in China's perspective 
by providing an empirical analysis of the relationship between the non-guaranteed WMPs and 
total WMPs and yield on new WMPs. In this study, the 1st section presents the introduction. 
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Section 2 contains the related literature. Section 3 is covering the methodology. Lastly, 
Results and discussion are accessible in section 4.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1. Shadow banking and institutional background 
Multiple concepts and interpretations have risen for shadow banking. The evolution of these 
non-traditional parallel intermediary institutions has drawn the interest of academic 
researchers and decision-makers around the world. (Allen & Gu, 2020) argued that Shadow 
banking is characterized generally as any type of credit intermediation that exists outside the 
financial system that is mainstream or regulated. China's shadow banking has been in 
excessive growth in the last decade, mainly motivated by regulatory arbitrage and constraints 
on specific sectors to achieve the requisite financing. Shadow finance refers in the broader 
context to non-bank financial institutions engaged in loan transformation and long-term loans 
securitization, such as mortgage-backed securities and short-term financial instruments 
(Acharya et al., 2013; Wu & Shen, 2018; Zoltan Pozsar et al., 2012). (Gabrieli et al., 2018) 
further explained that the notion of shadow banking in China is different from other countries, 
as China's banking sector plays a critical part in shaping shadow banking activities.  Unlike 
shadow banking in the U.S, Chinese shadow banking is primarily dominated by commercial 
banks. A traditional Chinese shadow banking activity includes fully controlled commercial 
banks in which a shadow trust or a shell-company is formed to transfer savings and lending 
business out of the balance sheet. 
2.2. Risk-Return perspective of wealth management products 
China's shadow banking growth is the outcome of regulatory arbitrage; from this angle, the 
U.S. and China's shadow banking has a resemblance. Chinese banks are engaged in the 
issuance of non-guaranteed or principal floating WMPs, because of the regulatory constraints 
such as loan to deposit ratio and the deposit rate cap. The majority of these WMPs are off the 
balance sheet, which consequently helps banks escape regulatory restrictions. Growth in 
shadow banking is seen as the response of the Chinese banking sector to regulatory arbitrage. 
(Yang et al., 2019) concluded that a variety of regulations are being tried by the Chinese 
regulators to mitigate the rapidly rising shadow banking industry risks. However, banks could 
still find a way out by choosing or exploring another poorly controlled sector. As a result, 
regulators have failed to regulate shadow banking activities in China properly.  
(Luo et al., 2019) investigated a maturity mismatch by analyzing the expected yields of 
newly issued wealth management products by the top 16 Chinese commercial banks. 
(Acharya et al., 2020) explained that issuing WMPs has a positive and substantial effect on 
the yields of new WMPs for the SMBs, but such association does not occur for the major four 
banks. They are not as active as SMBs in issuing WMPs, because the volume of WMPs 
maturing in each quarter does not require large-scale fundraising by issuing new products. 
These large banks are capable of raising funds from the interbank market. In comparison, 
SMBs face more significant liquidity deficits and offer substantially higher returns to attract 
more investors. 
As discussed above, the studies have found that the shadow banking industry in China is 
driven primarily by regulatory arbitration, and WMPs play a significant role in shaping this 
sector. The current literature has shown that Chinese banks mainly have a specific connection 
with off-balance-sheet non-guaranteed WMPs. The yield on new WMPs and the issuance of 
non-guaranteed & guaranteed WMPs have a positive relationship. Based on this discussed 
literature, this study empirically examined the effect of the issuance of WMPs on the yields of 
new WMPs by Chinese commercial banks.  
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Theoretical Framework 
The wealth management products constitute a significant portion of overall shadow banking 
in China. These financial products offer higher yields than the conventional deposit rate. 
Having fixed maturities make these products more alike deposits, but regulatory authorities 
never treated them as deposits because non-guaranteed WMPs are leading contributors in total 
issued WMPs and totally off the balance sheet.  The commercial banks involved in the wealth 
management business offer higher yields on new wealth management products. One 
important reason for offering higher yields is to raise funds for refinancing in terms of their 
long-term assets, i.e., the assets financed by the issuance of WMPs are long-term, but the 
maturities are often short-term (Acharya et al., 2020). With more WMPs maturing, banks 
would offer higher yields on new WMPs to attract more potential investors. This notation 
further elaborates on the relationship between issuance of WMPs and expected yields.  
The non-guaranteed and total WMPs have different impacts on the yield of new WMPs 
for SMBs and large four banks. We expect this effect is significant and positive for small and 
medium-sized banks, but not for large four banks. First, these four large banks have a vast 
expanding network of branches across China, making the availability of funds more 
accessible. Second, these banks can tap the interbank market to arrange the required funding 
easily. Additionally, large four banks have alternate funding sources, so they do not entirely 
depend on the issuance of WMPs to raise funds. Conversely, small and medium-sized banks 
have higher liquidity demands and cannot be entirely fulfilled from the interbank market. As a 
result, SMBs offer higher yields on the new WMPs to attract more investors. For SMBs, both 
non-guaranteed and total WMPs have a positive effect on the yield of new WMPs.  
3.2. Empirical Design  
The effect of bank-specific and other explanatory on the yield of new-issued wealth 
management products is estimated using data on 30 Chinese banks from the first quarter of 
2013 to the last quarter of 2019. The panel regression models are as follows: (           )        (      )   +           +        +       +                (1) (           )        (     )   +           +        +       +                 (2) 
The dependent variable is the difference between wealth management products' expected 
yield and deposit rate. The key independent variables are non-capital guaranteed WMPs and 
total WMPs issued by the bank  , in quarter t, and ε is the error term, expressed in equation (1) 
and (2), respectively.                      are coefficients of non-capital guaranteed 
WMPs-&-total WMPs, the difference between Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (SHIBOR) 
and deposit rate, Debt-to-Assets ratio (DAR), Loan-to-Debt ratio (LDR) and Size (total 
revenues), respectively. As suggested by (Changyong et al., 2014; Gabrieli et al., 2018), all 
the variables are log-transformed, as it is highly suggested for data normality. It further 
improves data validity in terms of possible sharpness.  
3.3. Empirical Procedure  
A large strand of the empirical literature on China's shadow banking, mostly related to wealth 
management products, adopted static panel models, i.e., fixed effects, random effects, and 
LSDV estimation techniques, such as (Acharya et al., 2020; An & Yu, 2018; Liao, 2020; Luo 
et al., 2019; Wu & Shen, 2018). In terms of panel data, fixed and random effects models are 
the two most important estimation methods, which statistically examine the group and time 
effects linked with panel data's individual and heterogeneity components (Park, 2011).  
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Consistent with equations (1) and (2) as discussed in the last section, first, this study 
performed (Hausman, 1978) specification test to determine between fixed and random effects 
models. The null hypothesis for this test is "no correlation between regressors and the 
individual effects." The rejection of the null hypothesis would result in the approval of the 
fixed-effects model. 
To examine the issues of heteroskedasticity, this study performed two tests. First, as 
explained by (Greene, 2012), under the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, a White's test for 
heteroskedasticity was executed. Second, as examined by (Greene, 2000), a modified Wald's 
test of heteroskedasticity was implemented after the fixed effects model. To examine the issue 
of serial correlation; First, this study performed a (Wooldridge, 2002) statistical procedure, as 
implemented by (Drukker, 2003). Lastly, a Breusch Pagan Godfrey test for panel data auto-
correlation was executed as statistically explained by (Greene, 2012). After estimating the 
fixed effects model and confirmation of heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation from the 
diagnostic tests surfaced the way to undertake the Driscoll and Kraay standard errors (DKSE) 
model as corroborated by (Driscoll & Kraay, 1998; Hoechle, 2007), and Panel Corrected 
standard errors (PCSE) estimation model as statistically explained by (Beck & Katz, 1995; 
Moundigbaye et al., 2018).  
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. Data and summary statistics  
This study covers a comprehensive sample of 30 top Chinese banks. These banks contain 
70% assets of China's total banking system and the leading contributors in terms of issuance 
of wealth management products. The diversified sample of 30 banks comprises four large 
state-owned commercial banks, eleven joint-stock commercial banks, thirteen city 
commercial banks, and two rural commercial banks. Appendix A depicts the details. The four 
large state-owned commercial banks categorized as Big4 and other small and medium-sized 
banks as SMBs, over the period from the 1st quarter of 2013 to the last quarter of 2019.  
This study utilized a wide range of sources to collect the data. In terms of bank-related 
data, i.e., financial ratios and other variables, the WIND financial database was used. The 
periodic financial statements and Bloomberg database were further employed; these 
additional resources helped us transcend the missing data and robustness. Finally, we collect 
non-guaranteed and total wealth management products from the WIND financial database. 
This includes issuing banks' details, the date of issuance, expected yield and the type and 
category, the maturity information, and underlying assets. Non-guaranteed wealth 
management products are off the balance sheet and are considered the leading contributor to 
China's shadow banking. Banks do not consolidate the amount of these products into their 
financial reports. As empirically utilized by (Cai et al., 2019; Luo et al., 2019), the number of 
WMPs serves as the best proxy for the banking sector's exposure to the financial products.  
In Table 1, summary statistics and correlation matrix are presented. The non-guaranteed 
WMPs account for a substantial 78 percent of the cumulative WMPs released by all sample 
banks.  
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Table 1 Summary statistics with the correlation matrix  
Variables N Mean SD min Median max 
WMP-yield 840 2.673 .608 .967 2.705 4.658 
NG-WMPs 840 324.602 485.859 0 145 3789 
T-WMPs 840 401.571 528.039 0 194.5 3892 
SHIBOR-d 840 1.849 .65 .888 1.599 3.189 
DAR% 840 64.165 8.35 43.198 63.636 82.656 
LDR% 840 71.794 11.899 35.925 70.73 110.992 
T-Rev Billions 840 82.012 137.791 .83 20.397 855.164 
Variables   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
(1) WMP-yield 1.000      
(2) NG-WMPs 0.172 1.000     
(3) SHIBOR-d 0.425 0.158 1.000    
(4) DAR -0.286 0.017 -0.130 1.000   
(5) LDR 0.210 0.066 0.055 -0.326 1.000  
(6) T-rev -0.098 0.461 -0.045 0.169 0.385 1.000 
4.2. Fixed-Effects model and diagnostic tests 
The fixed-effects model results from our two main specifications in equation (1) and (2) are 
presented in Table 2, along with diagnostic tests. The dependent variable is WMPs-return (the 
difference between wealth management products' expected yield and deposit rate).  
The Hausman test was performed to determine between random effects and fixed effects 
models. The null hypothesis was rejected, which resulted in the approval of the fixed-effects 
model. The fixed-effects model results confirm and support our hypothesis, but this study 
needs to perform diagnostic tests to investigate these results' reliability. The null hypothesis of 
"homoskedasticity" was rejected at a 1% significant level for both White's and Modified Wald 
tests. For auto-correlation, Both Wooldridge and Breusch Pagan Godfrey tests were found 
significant at the 1% level and rejected the null hypothesis of "no first-order panel auto-
correlation."  
The diagnostic tests approved the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation; the 
results of the fixed effects model are no longer reliable. As a remedial measure, this employed 
study panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) and Driscoll and Kraay standard errors (DKSE) 
models (Beck & Katz, 1995; Driscoll & Kraay, 1998; Hoechle, 2007; Moundigbaye et al., 
2018).  
Table 2 Fixed Effects Model and diagnostic tests 
Variables All Banks Big4 SMBs 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
FE 
(6) 
FE 
NG-WMPs 0.104***  0.017  0.105***  
 (0.016)  (0.047)  (0.017)  
Total WMPs  0.095***  -0.020  0.104*** 
  (0.019)  (0.063)  (0.019) 
SHIBOR-d 0.202*** 0.206*** 0.336*** 0.350*** 0.186*** 0.188*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.045) (0.047) (0.017) (0.017) 
DAR -0.166*** -0.167*** -0.968*** -0.947*** -0.162*** -0.159*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.270) (0.275) (0.028) (0.029) 
LDR 0.148*** 0.144*** 0.651*** 0.671*** 0.133*** 0.129*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.159) (0.159) (0.020) (0.020) 
Size 0.169*** 0.168*** -0.147 -0.146 0.175*** 0.173*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.117) (0.117) (0.043) (0.043) 
Cons -0.173** -0.162 1.113** 1.318** -0.103 -0.132 
 (0.081) (0.101) (0.463) (0.506) (0.079) (0.098) 
Obs. 840 840 112 112 728 728 
Syed Mehmood Raza Shah, Fu Qiang, Muhammad Dawood and Muhammad Ishfaq 
http://www.iaeme.com/IJM/index.asp 592 editor@iaeme.com 
R2 0.411 0.401 0.634 0.634 0.415 0.406 
Tests                         Chi2-Statistics                    Hypothesis                                                     Decision 
Hausman test Chi2(5) 105.39*** Ho: Random effect model is appropriate 
Hi: Fixed-Effect model is appropriate 
Ho: rejected 
Hi: accepted 
White's test for 
homoscedasticity 
Chi2 (20) 147.64*** Ho: homoskedasticity 
Hi:  unrestricted heteroskedasticity 
Ho: rejected 
Hi: accepted 
Modified Wald test Chi2 (30) 347.63*** Ho: homoskedasticity 
Hi:  heteroskedasticity 
Ho: rejected 
Hi: accepted 
Wooldridge test  F (1,29) 101.685*** Ho: No 1st-order autocorrelation 
Hi: 1st-order autocorrelation 
Ho: rejected 
Hi: accepted 
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey test 
Panel rho 0.76*** Ho: No AR (1) autocorrelation 
Hi: AR (1) autocorrelation 
Ho: rejected 
Hi: accepted 
The dependent variable is WMPs-yield (the difference between wealth management products' expected yield and deposit 
rate). Standard errors are in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
4.3. Yield on new WMPs and WMPs issuance 
For all the 30 banks in the sample, Table 3 shows the results based on panel corrected 
standard errors (PCSE) and Driscoll and Kraay standard errors (DKSE) models, respectively. 
The results from both PCSE and DKSE estimation models are consistent with our hypothesis. 
The non-guaranteed WMPs and total WMPs have a positive and significant impact on the 
yields of newly issued WMPs by banks. Similar results were reported by (Acharya et al., 
2020). This positive and significant relationship further approves the earlier discussion that 
the issuance of WMPs is directly linked with the spread between the expected yield of new 
WMPs and the deposit rate. This makes sense, as an increase in the spread would attract more 
potential investors, and the deposit rate always remained lower than the yields of wealth 
management products. The majority of these WMPs have short maturities; our results confirm 
that banks tend to offer higher yield on the new WMPs if more products are approaching their 
maturities.  
Table 3 PCSE and DKSE models for all banks 
Variables PCSE DKSE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
NG-WMPs 0.083***  0.104***  
 (0.014)  (0.037)  
Total WMPs  0.057***  0.095* 
  (0.016)  (0.047) 
SHIBOR-d 0.209*** 0.218*** 0.202*** 0.206*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.066) (0.067) 
DAR -0.067*** -0.070*** -0.166** -0.167** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.078) (0.075) 
LDR 0.110*** 0.101*** 0.148** 0.144** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.056) (0.055) 
Size -0.128*** -0.109*** 0.169 0.168 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.131) (0.131) 
Cons 0.006 0.109 -0.173 -0.162 
 (0.069) (0.086) (0.253) (0.306) 
Obs. 840 840 840 840 
R2 & Wald Chi2 340.03*** 303.61*** 0.41 0.40 
The models control for common auto-regressive parameter and panel level heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable is 
WMPs-yield (the difference between wealth management products' expected yield and deposit rate). PCSE and DKSE 
represent panel corrected standard errors and Driscoll and Kraay standard errors, respectively. Coefficients with standard 
errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The magnitude of this impact is also economically significant. In columns (1) and (2); for 
PCSE estimation models, a 1% increase in the issuance of non-guaranteed WMPs and total 
WMPs would lead to an increase in the yield of WMPs by 0.08% and 0.05%, respectively. 
Similarly, for DKSE estimation models in columns (3) and (4), a 1% increase in the issuance 
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of non-guaranteed WMPs and total WMPs would lead to an increase in the yield of WMPs by 
0.10% and 0.09%, respectively.  
As discussed earlier, banks also can tap the interbank market to improve liquidity and 
manage their maturing WMPs. The effect of SHIBOR-d (the difference between SHIBOR and 
deposit rate) on the yield of newly issued WMPs is positive and significant at a 1% level for 
all the PCSE, and DKSE estimated models.  These results are in line with (Acharya et al., 
2019). The deposits and yield of newly issued WMPs have a negative and significant 
relationship for both PCSE and DKSE models, further confirming that banks with lower 
deposit levels would offer higher yield on the WMPs to improve and control their deposit 
levels. For other control variables, LDR and size were significant in most of the models under 
PCSE and DKSE. 
4.4. Yield on new WMPs sub-groups 
Based on panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) and Driscoll and Kraay standard errors 
(DKSE) models, Table 4 presents the results for sub-groups, i.e., big four banks and small & 
medium-sized banks. For SMBs, issuance of both non-guaranteed and total WMPs has a 
positive and significant impact on the yields of the new WMPs, but there is no such 
significant relationship exists for large four banks. These results further confirm our earlier 
discussion that banks have different financing needs in terms of WMPs issuance. These 
different results for four large banks and SMBs have two implications; first, the large four 
banks can raise sufficient funds from the interbank market. Second, the large banks are less 
aggressive than the SMBs in terms of issuing the WMPs. Conversely, the SMBs are small in 
size, and they need to manage their liquidity channels; because of this disadvantage, SMBs 
offer substantially higher yields on the new WMPs to attract more investors. (Acharya et al., 
2020) have also obtained similar results for SMBs.  
Table 4. PCSE and DKSE models for large four and small & medium-sized banks 
 
Variables 
Big4 SMBs 
PCSE DKSE PCSE DKSE 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
NG-WMPs -0.049  0.017  0.099***  0.105**  
   (0.058)  (0.040)  (0.014)  (0.044)  
T-WMPs  -0.124*  -0.020  0.081***  0.104* 
    (0.064)  (0.073)  (0.017)  (0.055) 
SHIBOR-d 0.385*** 0.407*** 0.336*** 0.350*** 0.191*** 0.197*** 0.186*** 0.188*** 
   (0.058) (0.057) (0.061) (0.060) (0.018) (0.019) (0.065) (0.066) 
DAR -0.425* -0.296 -0.968* -0.947** -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.162** -0.159** 
   (0.225) (0.230) (0.268) (0.267) (0.018) (0.019) (0.074) (0.072) 
LDR 0.054 0.163 0.651* 0.671* 0.115*** 0.106*** 0.133** 0.129** 
   (0.166) (0.172) (0.198) (0.190) (0.017) (0.017) (0.054) (0.053) 
Size 0.175 0.155 -0.147 -0.146 -0.132*** -0.120*** 0.175 0.173 
   (0.135) (0.132) (0.122) (0.119) (0.023) (0.025) (0.125) (0.125) 
Cons 0.545 0.937* 1.113** 1.318** -0.056 0.003 -0.103 -0.132 
   (0.494) (0.484) (0.486) (0.599) (0.071) (0.089) (0.263) (0.325) 
Obs. 112 112 112 112 728 728 728 728 
R2&Wald 
Chi2 
59.69*** 64.13*** 0.63 0.63 298.75*** 258.32*** 0.42 0.41 
The models control for common auto-regressive parameter and panel level heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable is 
WMPs-yield (the difference between wealth management products' expected yield and deposit rate). PCSE and DKSE 
represent panel corrected standard errors and Driscoll and Kraay standard errors, respectively. Coefficients with standard 
errors are in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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The small & medium-sized banks have an economically significant effect. In columns (5) 
and (6); for panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) estimation models, a 1% increase in the 
issuance of non-guaranteed WMPs and total WMPs would lead to an increase in the yield of 
WMPs by 0.09% and 0.08%, respectively. Similarly, for DKSE estimation models in columns 
(3) and (4), a 1% increase in the issuance of non-guaranteed WMPs and total WMPs would 
lead to an increase in the yield of WMPs by 0.10% and 0.11%, respectively. These economic 
significance levels (from columns 5 to 8) also show that non-guaranteed and total WMPs 
issuance is positive and significant at a 1% level for PCSE, 5%, and 10% for DKSE 
estimation models, respectively.  The SHIBOR-d (the difference between SHIBOR and 
deposit rate) was positive and significant for large banks and SMBs, as both types of banks 
regularly tap the inter-bank market to fulfill their liquidity needs acquire funds to cover a 
portion of their maturing WMPs. The SHIBOR-d is significant and positive at a 1% level for 
all PCSE and DKSE estimations models.  
5. CONCLUSION 
This study empirically investigated the relationship between yields on new products and the 
issuance of wealth management products. WMPs arise as a competitive alternative for 
deposits mainly because relative to traditional deposit rates; these products carry higher 
returns and have no regulatory caps or interest rate limits. The off the balance sheet attribute 
of these products makes them more lucrative to the profit-seeking banking industry. The 
issuance of WMPs makes it easier for banks to conceal their assets' real risks, and it also helps 
them attract more investors. In both medium to long-term periods, a significant fraction of the 
assets funded by WMPs pay off, but many investors prefer short-term investment products, as 
do other involved banks and institutions. The WMPs originating banks often prefer short 
maturities to pass the WMP funds to deposit accounts of investors at maturity (even for just a 
few days), which can help raise the balance of deposits. To achieve the repayment of mature 
WMPs, banks can reach into the inter-bank market or start issuing WMPs. However, small 
and medium-sized banks rely more on WMPs by offering higher yields.  
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 APPENDIX 
S.N. Bank names Bank type 
1 Agricultural Bank of China; Industrial and Commercial Bank of China; Bank of 
China; China Construction Bank 
04-State-owned Big 
Four banks 
2 Bank of Communications; China Bohai Bank; China Zheshang Bank; Hua Xia 
Bank; China CITIC Bank; Shanghai Pudong Development Bank; China 
Everbright Bank; China Merchants Bank; China Minsheng Banking; Industrial 
Bank; Ping-An Bank 
11- Joint-stock 
commercial banks 
3 Bank of Beijing; Bank of Chongqing; Bank of Dongguan; Bank of Hangzhou; 
Bank of Hebei; Bank of Nanjing; Bank of Ningbo Bank of Ningxia; Bank of 
Shanghai; Bank of Tianjin; Harbin Bank; Zhejiang Chouzhou Commercial Bank; 
Hankou Bank HKB 
13-City commercial 
banks 
4 
Guangzhou Rural Commercial Bank; Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank 
02- Rural commercial 
banks 
Source: Created by authors 
 
